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NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW
to appellate review and an application for a parole inconsistent.
The former is an appeal for a review of the merits of the conviction,
the latter a simple application for the grace of the state. How can
a court of any conscience justify a refusal of the right of appeal on
the ground that defendant has already requested mercy? It is the
opinion of this writer that a court is unjustified in refusing a




CITIZENS FOR CONTINUOUS FOREIGN RESIDENCE-Appellant, a German
national by birth, emigrated to the United States with her
parents in 1939 and became a citizen of the United S t a t e s
derivatively through the naturalization of her mother in 1950. After
receiving a baccalaureate degree from Smith College in 1954, appel-
lant accepted a scholarship for postgraduate study in Europe.
2
While in Paris, she became engaged to a German national whom she
married in 1956. Since that time, except for two brief visits to the
United States, appellant has resided in Germany.3 In 1959 the
United States Consulate in Dusseldorf refused to grant appellant an
extension of her passport, declaring that she had lost her United
States citizenship under the terms of section 352 (a) (1) of the Im-
migration and Nationality Act of 1952. 4  The Board of Review on
the Loss of Nationality in the State Department affirmed the
Consulate's decision, and appellant challenged this ruling. Upon
appeal the United States Supreme Court held, that section 352 (a) (1)
1. Expatriation has been defined as the voluntary renunciation or abandonment of
nationality and allegiance. Perkins v. Elg, 307 U.S. 325, 334 (1939). Denationalization,
on the other hand, denotes involuntary forfeiture of citizenship Imposed by the sovereign.
WEis, NATIONALITY AND STATELESSNESS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 119 (1956). Many courts
have used the terms interchangeably, and as a result, much confusion exists in the area.
No attempt has been made to distinguish between the two concepts in this comment. For
further discussion, see WEis, supra at 119-122.
2. Brief for Appellant, p. 5, Schneider v. Ruck, 84 Sup. Ct. 1187 (1964).
3. Appellant is the mother of four sons, two of whom were born prior to the com-
mencement of denationalization proceedings and are deemed native born, Immigration
and Nationality Act § 301(a) (7), (b), 66 Stat. 235 (1952), 8 U.S.C. § 1401(a) (7), (b)
(1958), but unless they come to the United States before attaining the age of twenty-
three and reside here continuously for five years, they will lose their citizenship. The
subsequent loss of their mother's citizenship does not affect their status provided they
take up permanent residence in the United States before Attaining th age of twenty-five.
Section 355, 66 Stat. 272 (1952), 8 U.S.C. § 1487 (1958). The status of the two sons
born subsequent to the commencement of these proceedings was dependent upon a favor-
able decision in this case. Brief for Appellant, supra note 2, at 6.
4. 66 Stat. 269 (1952), 8 U.S.C. § 1484(a)(1) (1958): "(a) A person who has be-
come a national by naturalization shall lose his nationality by-
(1) having a continuous residence for three years in the territory of a foreign
state of which he was formerly a national or in which the place of his birth is situated,
except as provided in section 353 of this title .. " The exceptions comprised in section
353 relate, inter alia, to study abroad, ill health, and employment by the Government.
See also Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 § 352(a) (2), 66 Stat. 269 (1952),
8 U.S.C. § 1484(a)(2) (1958) which provides that a naturalized citizen may be ex-
patriated for residing in any foreign state for a period of five years. In Lapides v.
Clark, 176 F.2d 619 (D.C. Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 860 (1949), § 404(c) of the
Nationality Act of 1940, 54 Stat. 1170, the predecessor of § 352(a) (2), was upheld. In
view of the present decision, § 352 (a) (2) appears clearly unconstitutional.
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of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 providing for de-
nationalization of naturalized citizens residing continuously for three
years in the country of birth constituted discrimination so unjusti-
fiable as to be violative of due process. Mr. Justice Clark, with
whom Mr. Justice White and Mr. Justice Harlan concurred,5 dis-
sented, observing that the Constitution itself draws distinctions
between native-born and naturalized citizens, and the classification
employed by Congress was reasonably devised to meet a demon-
strated need.' Schneider v. Rusk, 84 Sup. Ct. 1187 (1964).
The doctrine of perpetual and indefeasible allegiance character-
ized early common law vis-a-vis expatriation." In the United States,
however, the right of expatriation received prompt recognition,9
although authorities differed as to whether expatriation were permis-
sible without governmental sanction. 10 By 1868 Congress had resolved
any vestiges of doubt in favor of unilateral expatriation.1 Never-
theless, the first definitive legislation enunciating the procedure
for accomplishing expatriation did not appear until 1907.12 Paradox-
ically, the 1907 enactment also embraced a proviso asserting
involuntary expatriation of naturalized citizens for foreign resi-
dence,' 3 although such residence constituted a rebuttable presumption
which could be easily overcome; 14 and as interpreted by the Attorney
6. Mr. Justice Brennan took no part in the decision of this case.
6. Schneider v. Rusk, 84 Sup. Ct. 1187, 1194 (1964) (dissenting opinion).
7. Protection of naturalized citizens today is a sensitive matter in a number of
countries-particularly Belgium, Greece, France, Iran, Israel, Switzerland, and Turkey-
which refuse to recognize the expatriation of their nationals who acquire American citi-
zenship. Conscription in the armed services appears to pose the most serious threat to
amicable foreign relations with these countries. Brief for Appellee, pp. 45-46, Schneider
v. Rusk, 84 Sup. Ct. 1187 (1964).
8. In Calvin's Case, 7 Co. Rep. 1(a), 13(a), 77 Eng. Rep. 377, 392 (Ex. 1608)
immutability4 of allegiance took this form: "Seeing then that faith, obedience, and
ligeance are due by the law of nature, it followeth that the same cannot be changed
or taken away .. ." Over a century and a quarter later, the doctrine enunciated in
Calvin's Case was corroborated in Rex v. Macdonald, 18 How. St. Tr. 858, 859 (1747):
"it is not in the power of any private subject to shake off his allegiance, and to trans-
fer It to a foreign prince. Nor is it in the power of any foreign prince by naturalizing
and employing a subject of Great Britain to dissolve the bond of allegiance between the
subject and the crown." See generally TSIANG, THE QUESTION OF EXPATRIATION IN
AMERICA PRIOR To 1907, at 11-24 (1942).
9. TSIANG, op. cit, aupra note 8, at 25.
10." "In this country, expatriation is conceived to be a fundamental right. As far as
the principles maintained, and the practice adopted by the government of the United
States Is evidence of its existence, it is fully recognized. It is constantly exercised, and
has never in any way been restrained." Juando v. Taylor, 13 Fed. Cas. 1179, 1181 (No.
7558) (S.D.N.Y. 1818). Contra. Shanks v. Dupont, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 242, 246 (1830)
wherein the Court asserted: "The general doctrine is, that no persons can, by any act
of their own, without the consent of the government, put off their allegiance and be-
come aliens."
11. "iT]he right of expatriation is a natural and inherent right of all people, Indis-
pensable to the enjoyment of the rights of life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness.
Act of July 27, 1868, ch. 249, 15 Stat. 223.
12. Act of March 2, 1907, ch. 2534, 34 Stat. 1228.
13. Section 2 provided: "When any naturalized citizen shall have resided for two
years in the foreign state from which he came, or for five years in any other foreign
state it shall be presumed that he has ceased to be an American citizen, and the place
of his general abode shall be deemd his place of residence during said years: Provided,
however, That such presumption may be overcome on the presentation of satisfactory
evidence to a diplomatic or consular officer of the United States, under such rules and
regulations as the Department of State may prescribe .. " This act also provided that
any American citizen would be presumed to have expatriated himself by being naturalized
in a foreign state or by taking an oath of allegiance to a foreign state. In addition, the
citizenship of any American woman who married a foreigner was suspended during
coverture. In Mackenzie v. Hare, 239 U.S. 299 (1915), the latter provision was upheld
as a valid exercise of congressional authority.
14. United States v. Gay, 264 U.S, 353, 358 (1924).
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General, withdrew governmental protection, not citizenship. 15  Dis-
satisfaction with administrative difficulties encountered under the
1907 act 16 led to the enactment of the Nationality Act of 194017 which
made foreign residence by naturalized citizens grounds for automatic
forfeiture of citizenship. 8 With but slight modification, 9 this pro-
vision was incorporated into the Immigration and Nationality Act
of 1952.20
While the Constitution nowhere expressly authorizes Congress
to expatriate either native-born or naturalized citizens, such power
has been adduced on the bases of the attributes of sovereignty,2 1
the inherent power of Congress to regulate foreign affairs,22 and
the war power.2  Conversely, there are formidable dicta which
categorically deny the existence of congressional expatriatory author-
ity.24 However, in view of the recent Supreme Court decision in
Perez v. Brownel1, 25 that Congress may provide for expatriation
under carefully circumscribed conditions is no longer moot.
In the instant case, Schneider premised her principal argument
upon the ground that section 352 (a) (1) of the Immigration and
Nationality Act of 195226 deprived her of citizenship without due
process of law, contrary to the Fifth Amendment, in that this section
subjected her to consequences not imposed upon native-born citizens,
thereby discriminating against her solely on the grounds of her
birth and national origin.27 Distinctions between citizens solely
because of their ancestry have been regarded as odious in a free
society.2 8  While the Fifth Amendment contains no equal protection
clause, it does forbid discrimination that is "so unjustifiable as to
be violative of due process. ' ' 29  However, not every instance of
15. 28 OPs. ATT'Y GEN. 504, 510 (1910).
16. UNITED STATES COMMITTEE To REVIEW THE NATIONALITY LAWS, 76TH CONG., 1ST
SESS., NATIONALITY LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES at 70-71 (Comm. Print 1939).
17. 54 Stat. 1137 (1940).
18. Section 404(b) provided that a person who had become a national by naturaliza-
tion should lose his nationality by "residing continously for three years in the territory
of a foreign state of which he was formerly a national or in which the place of his
birth is situated. .... "
19. Section 101(a) (33), 66 Stat, 166, 8 U.S.C.S. § 1101 (a) (33) defines residence as con-
tinuous where there is a continuity of stay but not necessarily an uninterrupted physical
presence In a foreign state.
20. Section 352(a) (1), 66 Stat. 269 (1952), 8 U.S.C. § 1484(a)(1) (1958).
21. Mackenzie v. Hare, 239 U.S. 299 (1915).
22. Perez v. Brownell, 356 U.S. 44 (1958).
23. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 120 (1958) (dissenting opinion).
24. United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649 (1897). In Osborn v. Bank of
United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738, 827 (1824), Chief Justice Marshall stated: "A
naturalized citizen is, indeed, made a citizen under an act of congress, but the act does
not proceed to give, to regulate, or to prescribe his capacities. He becomes a member of
the society, possessing all the rights of a native citizen, and standing, in view of the
constitution, on the footing of a native. The constitution does not authorize congress to
enlarge or abridge those rights. The simple power of the national legislature is, to pre-
scribe a uniform rule of naturalization, and the exercise of this power exhausts it, so
far as respects the individual."
25. See note 22 supra.
26. See note 20 supra.
27. Appellant also contended that section 352(a)(1) violated the Eighth Amendment
In that it imposed a cruel and unusual punishment, and that section 352(a)(1) was
unconstitutional because It imposed punishment or other sanctions without affording the
procedural safeguards guaranteed by the Fifth and Sixth Amendments. Brief for Ap-
pellant, supra note 2, at 2.
28. Hlrabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943).
29. Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954).
RECENT CASES
discrimination transcends the requirements of due process.80 To
incur censure under the Fifth Amendment, the legislative classifi-
cation must be arbitrary and unreasonably discriminatory.3 1 The
reasonableness test espoused in Perez3 and postulated in Schneider-3
is, "Is the means, withdrawal of citizenship, reasonably calculated
to affect [sic] the end that is within the power of Congress to
achieve, the avoidance of embarrassment in the conduct of our
foreign relations . . .?" Mr. Justice Douglas, speaking for the
majority, answered in the negative, observing that the statute
proceeds upon the impermissible assumption that naturalized citizens
as a class are less reliable and bear less allegiance to this country
than do the native-born,34 and the legislative intent did not demon-
strate a valid exercise of congressional authority.
3 5
Considering the present membership of the Supreme Court, there
appears little doubt but that denationalization legislation will en-
counter rigorous opposition. Three Justices are committed to the
position that congressional authority to denationalize is nonexistent
absent expatriation by the voluntary renunciation of nationality and
allegiance. 36 It may well be anticipated that this minority will
muster the requisite support to defeat attempted denationalization
from the veritable arsenal available in the Fifth, Sixth, and Eighth
Amendments to the Constitution which have been successfully




CRIMINAL LAW-RAPE-MISTAKE OF AGE AS A D E F E N S E-
The defendant was charged with statutory rape of a minor seventeen
years and nine months of age. The defendant offered evidence to
show his lack of criminal intent due to a reasonable and substantial
belief that she was eighteen years of age or older, the age of legal
consent. This evidence was not admitted and the defendant was
found guilty in Superior Court. On appeal, the Supreme Court of
California held, the defendant's reasonable belief that the prosecutrix
30. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944). Accord, Hirabayashi v. United
States, supra note 28.
31. Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934).
32. 856 U.S. 44, 58 (1958).
33. 84 Sup. Ct. 1187, 1189 (1964).
34. Id. at 1190.
35. Id. at 1189.
36. See Mr. Chief Justice Warren's dissent In Perez at 68-69; Mr. Justice Douglas'
dissent in Perez at 83-84; and Mr. Justice Black's concurring opinion in Nishikawa v.
Dulles, 356 U.S. 129 (1958) at 138-39.
37. In Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144 (1963), the Court struck down a
provision which asserted automatic expatriation for evading military service, declaring
that it was penal in nature and would inflict severe punishment without due process of
law and without the safeguards which must attend a criminal prosecution under the
Fifth and Sixth Amendments. And in Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958), a denationaliza-
tion provision for desertion was found penal and violative of the Eighth Amendment's
prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment.
